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EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN 
HUNGARY: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH  
AND APPLICATIONS*
This paper surveys Hungarian applications of Empirical Industrial Organization. The ar-
ticles and methods are grouped primarily based on the complexity of the data used, 
starting with the simplest. The paper also discusses how the results can be applied in 
the main areas of competition policy and economic regulation, in supporting analy-
ses of market definitions, and in evaluating market power and the effects of market 
behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys the Hungarian literature in the area of Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (empirical IO for short), focusing especially on the possible practical 
applications of the results. In this case, “Hungarian” means that I present articles 
analysing Hungarian markets; in practice this also means that I only survey papers 
written by Hungarian authors.1 These articles use empirical IO methods to varying 
degrees, and this is represented in my discussion of them.
A paper is considered to fall under the cateogry of empirical IO if it not only 
describes a market using basic statistics, but also aims to test hypotheses, based on 
economic models, analysing the relationships between various variables (usually, 
but not always via regression analysis). It is of course not possible to exactly define 
the boundaries of empirical IO; based on their broader topics and methods, there 
are many papers that would fit the bill in labour economics (for example, Brown 
et al. [2006]), agricultural economics (e.g. Fertő [2009]), economic geography (e.g. 
Békés and Harasztosi [2013]) or the economics of international trade (e.g. Békés and 
  * I am especially grateful to my previous co-authors Dávid Farkas, Gábor Kézdi and Gábor Koltay, 
who have, over the past years, greatly influenced the ideas presented here. I would also like to thank 
András Kiss, László Kóczy, Balázs Muraközy, Péter Nagy, Zoltán Pápai, and also editors Ferenc Kiss 
and Pál Valentiny for their invaluable comments on a previous version of this paper. The lists of 
references, compiled by Éva Bálint, appearing annually in the book series “Verseny és szabályozás” 
[Competition and Regulation] were very helpful. I have attempted to mention all relevant papers 
since 2005, and apologise for any omissions. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the 
LP-004/2010 “Lendület” [Momentum] programme.
 1 For empirical IO papers by Hungarian authors regarding non-Hungarian markets, see for exam-
ple Paizs [2009] and Koltay [2012a]. I currently have no knowledge of exclusively non-Hungarian 
authors focusing on a Hungarian market.
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Muraközy [2012]). However, these papers are not traditionally classified as empirical 
IO, and are therefore not discussed in this survey.
Empirical IO papers aim to reveal the relationships governing market behaviour, 
using empirical methods within an economic framework. They can thereby confirm 
or refute either various hypotheses arising in everyday or regulatory thinking, or 
the results of theoretical models. It is important to note, however, that the method 
employed by the analyst will always remain arbitrary to some extent, and will rely on 
simplifying assumptions and the choice of theoretical model, which can influence 
the results. It is impossible, even in theory, to find a universally applicable method 
or functional form to test; these must always be determined by the available data 
and the trends apparent in it, as well as the research questions. And finally, we can 
only trust the robustness of the results (and we can never be 100 per cent sure), if 
as many methods as possible point to the same conclusion.
There can be several practical applications of the results of empirical IO, in the 
fields of competition policy and economic regulation among others. These applica-
tions typically concern one or more of the following three main questions.
1. Relevant market definition: the analysis of substitutability between potentially 
competing products and thereby the definition of the (product or geographical) 
market within which firms exert effective competitive pressure on each other.
2. Evaluation of market power: the analysis of whether a given firm is able to maintain 
a price that is above the assumed (so-called effective) competitive price level.
3. Evaluation of the effects of market behaviour: the analysis of how the behaviour 
(for example, an agreement or merger) of certain firms affected or is expected to 
affect market outcomes, competitors and consumers.
There are serious microeconomic considerations behind each of these – both theo-
retically and practically – relevant questions, which are however outside the scope 
of this survey.2
The following chapter provides a short, methodological and historical review of 
empirical IO in general. Then, I survey empirical papers based on the kind of data 
they use, starting with the simplest.3 I do this firstly because the available data greatly 
influences the type and depth of the research questions that can be answered, and 
secondly because the structure of the data essentially provides a grouping of the 
applicable empirical methods as well.
 2 For further details and references, I recommend Bishop and Walker’s [2010] book, which com-
prehensively discusses the theoretical background, the suitable empirical methods and several 
competition policy applications related to these topics. 
 3 From a historical perspective, the models could be presented starting from demand estimation, 
however, in practice the quality of the data is key; and it is especially important to establish the 
limitations of the simpler methods as soon as possible.
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1. Analyses based on price data only: price data is the easiest to access, as it is 
often publicly available or accessible from statistical databases (like the Central 
Statistical Office, KSH). The papers usually apply time series analyses. It is rare 
that these methods alone lead to conclusive results, but they can provide useful 
illustrative evidence for questions relating to market definition or market power.
2. Analyses based on price data and simple statistical indicators: price data can be 
complemented with data concerning the number of firms on the market or other 
aggregate concentration measures, sometimes even from publicly available sources.4 
These analyses typically use reduced form cross-sectional or panel estimation methods. 
It is both an advantage and a disadvantage of such methods that they examine the 
relationship between market performance and market structure directly, without 
deriving it from an underlying economic model in a strict sense. These analyses 
typically concern market power, and especially the evaluation of market behaviour.
3. Analyses based on price data and detailed quantity data: data on demand or 
costs is in most cases only available from firms or public institutions, therefore it 
is rarely used for research purposes only. If such data is available, a multitude of 
regression estimation methods can be used, including structural models. These 
methods typically make it possible to build theoretically grounded models based 
on empirical observations, or at least test hypotheses related to them. They can 
be used to analyse all three types of questions.
I will be very brief in introducing the theoretical models and econometric expres-
sions and methods used in the surveyed papers. The interested reader will find the 
detailed descriptions in the referenced papers themselves.
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
Empirical IO aims to analyse the Structure-Conduct-Performance (the so-called SCP) 
paradigm. Research in this field, which began in the 1950s, initially took a rather 
simplified view of these relationships, assuming that market structure, and the 
technological and entry barriers behind it, completely determined price, as well as 
other variables important for consumer welfare. Consequently the first empirical 
papers analysed the causal relationship between some measure of concentration (like 
the number of firms, or an index calculated from market shares), which described 
market structure, and prices; typically across several industries.5 Such analyses led 
 4 Sometimes data is available on margins or similar performance measures (such as profitability or 
innovations), instead of prices. The analyses can be conducted in a similar way and I refer to all 
these measures, for the sake of simplicity, as “prices”. 
 5 These are sometimes called cross-industry analyses.
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to many erronous results, mainly due to the endogeneity between the dependent 
and the independent variables (that is, that causality runs both ways between struc-
ture and performance), and the fact that it is difficult for a competition agency, for 
example, to draw practical (or policy-related) conclusions about markets or market 
behaviour based on comparisons between different industries.6 Analyses took a new 
direction in the second half of the 1980s, and new empirical IO was born.7 These 
empirical investigations are firmly grounded in theoretical models of industrial or-
ganisation, which use modern economic (primarily, but not exclusively game theo-
retical) tools to describe firms’ behaviour. New empirical IO analyses and structural 
empirical IO models are therefore often used as synonyms, but this is misleading: 
new empirical IO is part of a wider family, since many modern empirical IO papers 
estimate reduced form regressions. Over the past years, confidence in the “superior-
ity” of structural models has been shaken in several areas,8 and these is an ongoing 
debate among leading experts about whether, in some cases, it is sufficient or even 
better to use reduced form models.9
New empirical IO focuses primarily on analyses within given markets, and there-
fore leads to clearer and more easily applicable conclusions. More specific ques-
tions also enable the researcher to control for other independent variables, which 
eliminates several econometric problems; this, however, requires a lot of data. The 
specificity of the analysed questions often reverses the usual relationship between 
theory and applications: new methods used in empirical IO and published as re-
search results are often developed because new problems were encountered when 
analysing a given market – for example, when consulting with agencies or firms in 
competition policy or regulatory cases.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE DATA
The academic community is often sceptical of empirical analyses based solely on 
price data, since the researcher is usually unable to use and control for the reac-
tions to price changes.10 It would be wrong to completely discount price analyses, 
however, because often price data is all that is available to the researcher, and they 
 6 Schmalensee [1989] provides a comprehensive overview of this.
 7 This was first discussed by Bresnahan [1989], while Berry and Reiss [2007], and Doraszelski and 
Pakes [2007] provide more recent surveys. Davis and Garces [2010] give a detailed discussion of 
empirical methods and competition policy applications, mainly with European examples. 
 8 See Weinberg [2011] and his references about the “errors” made in the popular area of merger 
simulations. 
 9 See Einav and Levin [2010] and Nevo and Whinston [2010] for the debate in the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectivesben.
10 See Werden and Froeb [1993] for a thorough (though perhaps too strong) critique.
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can be useful, for example, in establishing stylised facts; these can form the basis for 
hypotheses which may be investigated with more advanced methods later.
It is worth mentioning an empirical method which typically relies on price data, 
even though, in itself, it seldom leads to scientifically valuable results: the correlation 
between the prices of two products or firms. If two products belong to the same 
(relevant) market, then the correlation between their prices over time is expected to 
be high; otherwise, an opportunity for arbitrage would arise, the customers would 
take advantage of it, and the relative price would return to the equilibrium.11 The 
stability of the relative price can also be investigated using econometric methods, 
so-called stationarity tests. The analysis of the “closeness of competition” between 
given firms can also be illustrated using correlation analysis.12 The main drawback 
of correlation analyses is that there is no fixed threshold above which correlation 
can be said to be high enough; furthermore, it is important to control for factors 
(such as common costs), which can cause false correlation. This is usually achieved 
by differencing the time series.
The relationship between prices at different levels of a product chain is a well-re-
searched topic. The typical approach is to conduct a so-called price-transmission 
analysis, which determines the pass-through by a downstream vertical level (re-
tail, for example) of the price changes implemented by an upstream vertical level 
(wholesale, to continue the example). The main idea is that in the case of perfect 
competition, the pass-through for costs should stand at 100 per cent, and therefore 
any lower value indicates market power at the lower vertical level. The possible 
asymmetry of price transmission can also be analysed; if there is market power 
present, then the retail price may respond more to an increase in wholesale prices 
than to an identical decrease.
These hypotheses can be tested using regressions on the differenced time series 
of the price changes in the following simplified form:
Δpt = α + β1 × Δwt × D+ + β2 × Δwt × D– + εt,
where pt and wt are the retail and wholesale prices at time t, and D+ and D– are dum-
my variables, taking on a value of 1 if the wholesale price increased or decreased 
in the given period, and 0 otherwise. The β1 and β2 parameters shows the level of 
transmission, and the hypotheses to test are H0: βi = 1 (perfect transmission), and 
H0: β1 = β2 (symmetric transmission).
Farkas et al. [2009] test these hypotheses for the wholesale and retail prices of 
gasonline. The level of price transmission is 0.98 for price increases, and 0.97 for 
11 A stable relative price / sufficiently high correlation is not, in itself, enough evidence of belonging 
to the same relevant market, however. 
12 These methods are demonstrated for gasoline markets in Chapter 5 of Farkas et al. [2009]. 
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decreases; these coefficients do not differ significantly from each other, but they do 
from 1. Based on these results, the hypothesis of asymmetric price transmission can 
definitely be rejected. The hypothesis of complete (100 per cent) price transmission 
can be rejected in a statistical sense, but 98 per cent transmission can effectively be 
considered perfect.13 These results therefore show no market power at the retail level.
The process of price adaptation can also be described using more complex, dy-
namic models, where the lagged dependent and independent variables, as well as 
the so-called error correction factors appear on the right-hand side of the estimated 
equation. Such error correction models provide a more detailed picture of price 
relationships, and enable the speed of transmission to be measured.14
An econometric method is also available to measure which vertical level affects 
which level’s prices. The so-called Granger causality test may be capable of achieving 
this goal, using methods of time series analysis similar to those above. However, it 
is important to handle the results with care when interpreting them as evidence of 
market power, as there is no underlying microeconomic model behind the hypothe-
ses. Popovics and Tóth [2006] use this method in a detailed analysis of the Hungarian 
milk product chain, looking at the prices at the production, processing and retail 
levels, and conclude that the price at the processing level Granger-causes both the 
production and the retail level prices (and the reverse does not hold), which they 
interpret as evidence of market power at the processing level.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE DATA AND SIMPLE STATISTICAL 
INDICATORS
There are several motivations for analysing the relationships between price data 
and structural measures. Firstly, they address one of the main issues of the struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm directly – namely, how market structure de-
termines various performance indicators. Secondly, it is an important practical 
consideration that such analyses can be relatively easily conducted using publicly 
available databases. And finally, the results of such empirical investigations can 
typically still be understood by a professional audience of non-economists (like 
lawyers and decision-makers), and their results are therefore easier to implement 
than those presented later.
13 Especially considering that the price of gasoline is available at most at a precision of one decimal, 
while the largest weekly wholesale price change is not greater than 15 forints. 
14 The paper by Farkas et al. [2009] conducts a simplified form of this analysis for the case shown 
in the previous paragraph, but the results changed only very slightly. Such so-called vector error 
correction models (also referred to as ECM or VECM models) are especially widespread in agri-
cultural economics, see for example Bakucs and Fertő [2009].
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Price-concentration analyses
A price-concentration analysis is a widely used method, which seeks to establish 
the relationship between prices and the level of concentration in a given industry. 
If there is a significant, positive relationship between price and concentration, then 
the concentration measure used may be a good indicator of market power, that is, 
if the level of concentration in the industry is high or is increasing (due to a merger, 
for example), then the probability of competitive concerns arising is higher.
The simple estimated equation in a price-concentration study is typically the 
following:
price = f(concentration, controls).
The name of the method is somewhat restrictive in that it is not only the price that 
can be explained by concentration, but also the margin or other performance indi-
cators.15 The use of the margin is typically recommended (although of course the 
data does not always allow for this), firstly because the structural behavioural equa-
tions derived from theoretical IO models usually refer to the margin (competitive 
interactions are better represented in the margin), and secondly because certain 
econometric problems, like endogeneity and in the case of time series, stationarity, 
can be better handled.16
Regression analyses are typically conducted on cross-sectional databases, making 
use of the cross-sectional variation in levels of concentration. Therefore, data on 
several separate markets is required; often, geographically separated markets are 
good candidates.17 Of course, if there is variation over time in the concentration 
measures, panel methods can also be employed; this, however, partly overlaps with 
a method I will discuss later in the chapter.
Looking to the explanatory variables, there is no clear-cut answer concerning the 
correct concentration measure to use. C1, C4 and the Herfindahl–Hirschmann-index 
(HHI) are often used in the literature.18 The results are easier to interpret if the num-
ber of competitors on the market is used as a concentration measure:19 the C4 meas-
ure is insensitive to the merger of the second and third largest firm, for example, while 
the change in the HHI is difficult to interpret. We can achieve even more useful re-
15 Halpern and Muraközy analyse in this book the relationship between Hungarian firms’ R&D activity 
and various concentration measures using a regression methodology, and find an upside-down U-curve.
16 A time series of prices is usually non-stationary, while a time series of margins is more often so. 
17 It is important that we observe variation in prices. For example, if supermarkets employ uniform 
prices in their outlets, then it doesn’t help that concentration is different in various regional mar-
kets – the price-concentration analysis cannot be conducted. 
18 The Ci measure is the simple sum of the market shares of the largest i firms, while the HHI is the 
sum of the squares of (some type of ) market shares of all the firms on the market. 
19 In this case the hypothesis to test is a negative relationship: we expect that a decrease in the number 
of competing firms on the market leads to a price increase.
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sults if the presence of the larger competitors is coded using dummy variables, as this 
makes it easier to handle the possible non-linear effects of changes in concentration.20
Control variables are variables that also influence the price or the margin, but 
whose effect we wish to partial out, in order to answer the main question: how 
the level of concentration in itself influences the price. There are two basic types 
of control variables: demand and supply controls. For example, the size of a given 
regional market (the number of inhabitants), or its purchasing power are demand 
controls, while the price of main inputs (like labour or real estate), or the density of 
competitors in the given region are supply controls.21
There are two factors that can bias the estimates: possibly omitted variables, and 
the endogeneity of the relationship between price and concentration. Unfortunately, 
typically neither problem can be eliminated completely (often due to a lack of data), 
but this does not mean that the results are meaningless; it is worth verifying them us-
ing multiple methods, testing their robustness. One way to alleviate the endogeneity 
concern is to use two-step estimation, with the first step investigating the effect of 
demand controls on the density of competitors, and the second step estimating the 
effect of this density on prices or margins, using an instrumental variable approach.22
Farkas et al. [2009] conduct a price-concentration study for regional retail gas-
oline markets, estimating the relationship between the margin and the number of 
firms. Using various specifications, a significant negative relationship is found, how-
ever, it is not significant in an economic sense: the presence of a further competitor 
decreases price by 0.3-0.6 forints, less than 1 per cent of the average retail price.
Price-concentration studies can be combined with the price transmission analy-
ses presented in the previous chapter, to investigate whether the level of concentra-
tion or the composition of firms influenced the level of price transmission.23 Farkas et 
al. [2009], in the analysis of the gasonline market mentioned above, find no such re-
lationship between the level or asymmetry of transmission and the number of firms; 
Koltay [2012b] on the other hand analyses the pricing of each network of stations 
separately and finds a small degree of asymmetric transmission for certain networks.
The price-concentration studies discussed above may give the impression that 
the data limitations can be overcome, this is however often not the case for re-
searchers: the data may be available, but it constitutes a business secret. Typical 
applications in this field are so-called bidding studies, where the markets are the 
20 It is very likely, for example, that if the number of competing firms decreases from three to two, 
there is a larger effect on price than if it decreases from seven to six.
21 The strength of competition may be different, for example, if four competitors in a given area each 
have one, or if they each have five outlets. 
22 This is the method employed by Békés et al. [2011].
23 The hypothesis is that in a market with many participants, competition is close to perfect, and 
therefore pass-through is (close to) 100 per cent, but in two-firm markets, for example, pass-
through may be lower, which could indicate market power.
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separate auctions or tenders, and the final price is compared to the number of firms 
submitting bids, or dummy variables showing their presence. This method is often 
used to measure the strength of competition between competitors and the pressure 
they exert on each other on so-called bidding markets.24
Impact assessments
The other main method measuring the result of changes in stuctural indicators identi-
fies this effect using not the differences between markets, but the actual changes over 
time within a given market. Since these changes typically relate to entries and exits, the 
methods are sometimes called event studies, or shock analyses. However, in a broader 
sense they belong to the family of impact assessments used in many policy areas.25
The estimation strategy most often used for panel data in this area is based on 
the so-called difference-in-differences (or simply “diff-in-diff ” or DID) method. This 
quasi-experimental approach applies when the researcher is able to observe vari-
ous units (like markets and their prices) over time, some of which were exposed to 
some  “treatment” (like an entry or a merger), and some of which were not. There-
fore the effect of the given event (treatment) can be identified from the difference 
between the treated and control group (controlling, of course, for other factors). 
A panel database enables the use of cross-sectional and time fixed effects, which 
diminishes the omitted variable problem as well.
A paper by Csorba et al. [2011] applies a difference-in-differences approach to 
analyse the effects of two 2007 mergers, Agip-Esso and Lukoil-Jet, on retail prices in 
Hungarian local gasoline markets. The paper discusses the predictions of several IO 
models, for example that the prices of the merging companies increase more than 
those of their competitors; or that the price effect is larger on markets where the 
merging parties are each other’s competitors. The fact that the two mergers took 
place almost simultaneously makes the identification of the effects more difficult, 
however, the variance in the companies’ presence on the specific local markets 
enables the separation and estimation of the various effects. The analysis confirms 
several theoretically predicted asymmetric effects, but the ex post price effect of 
the mergers is minimal, although positive (according to the results, the price effect 
of each merger was smaller than 1 per cent).
Such models can be used to evaluate the ex post welfare effects of various policy 
interventions (in the previous example, the merger clearance decisions), and agen-
24 Csorba [2008] discusses such a study in detail for the case of a Hungarian merger. 
25 These methods are especially widespread in labour economics, for example. The “In focus” chap-
ter of the 2012 edition of “The Hungarian Labour Market” concerned this topic only (see Kézdi 
[2012]). Imbens and Wooldridge [2009] provide a thorough methodological survey. 
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cies can use them to assess planned mergers or interventions by analysing events 
from the past.26 The method is also suitable for evaluating smaller scale changes, 
caused by specific market players: Horváth et al. [2013], for example, use a differ-
ence-in-differences method to assess how the prices of flats which participated in 
a large energy efficiency-increasing renovation changed compared to similar flats 
that did not. Their results show a treatment effect of close to 10 per cent in flats 
belonging to the renovated building.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE AND QUANTITY DATA
The typical area of empirical analysis between prices and quantities is demand esti-
mation, and especially the estimation of own and cross-price elasticities, since these 
have many applications in competition policy and regulation. The most well-known 
application is the Hypothetical Monopolist Test and its variants (like Critical Loss 
Analysis), used in relevant market definition:27 if the own-price elasticity estimated 
for a product or group of products is not low enough, then a hypothetical monop-
olist of this product group would not be able to profitably raise prices; therefore, 
the relevant market should be wider. Further products should be included in the 
hypothetically monopolised market until the repeated demand estimation yields 
a sufficiently low elasticity.
It is worth noting that due to a lack of data and the difficulties of estimation the 
need may arise to measure consumer behaviour directly, typically using survey meth-
ods. While these methods are not usually considered standard tools of empirical IO, 
their results can be widely used, especially in practical applications.28
26 See, for example, Ashenfelter et al. [2006], which discusses the probably most well-known merger 
(Staples–Office Depot), where these econometric methods were used and seriously debated in 
American courts. 
27 The test is also called the HMT-test, or the SSNIP-test. See Muraközy [2010], which discusses 
hypothesis testing in telecommunication markets, for demand estimation methods used to imple-
ment the HMT and other tests. Bölcskei [2010] also surveys research questions arising in relation 
to telecommunications markets, and presents the empirical methods developed to answer them, 
as well as results for various countries. 
28 Édes et al. [2010] looked at the substitution between fixed and mobile telephone service providers, 
among other methods also using elasticites, pointing out the asymmetry in the direction of substi-
tution. Lőrincz and Nagy [2011] used the results of a consumer survey to analyse the components 
of switching costs for various telecommunications services (fixed and mobile telephony, internet), 
and estimated their size. Pápai et al. [2011] conducted a critical loss analysis to test whether the 
package deals offered by telecommunications companies could be considered a separate relevant 
market. Finally, Szolnoki and Tóth [2008] provide an example for energy markets. The authors 
estimated a function for the switching behaviour of consumers of electricity, based on a household 
survey, and then used it, together with other market data, to calibrate a theoretical model.
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Classic demand estimation
A regression for demand estimation takes the following simplified functional form:
qi = f(pi, p–i, Xi) + εi,
where qi is the quantity demanded of product i, pi is product i’s price, p–i is the price 
charged by potential competitors, and the X matrix contains the necessary control var-
iables (income, or other demand- or supply-side controls, for example). The equation 
can be estimated for several functional forms; the choice between them must be deter-
mined by the data and the assumptions of the model used. A common choice (which 
still, however, needs to be justified to some extent by the analyst) is to use the varia-
bles’ logarithms. In this case, the parameters estimated for pi directly provide the own-
price elasticity. Observations may be available for different consumers or consumer 
groups (or even settlements) in a give time period (cross-sectional form), for the same 
consumers over time (time series form), or for a combination of both (panel form).
As already discussed in the case of price-concentration analyses, the endogeneity 
between the dependent and independent variables can bias the estimates. While this 
problem was slightly less acute for price-concentration analyses where the structural 
indicators on the right-hand side changed quite slowly over time, it is very important 
in the case of demand estimation. One way to tackle this identification problem is 
to use the previously mentioned instrumental variable method. However, it is not 
easy to find good instruments (and good data for them), and there are consequently 
only very few Hungarian demand estimation analyses to be found.
Nagy et al. [2012] use a well-designed stepwise method to estimate the demand 
(elasticity) for fixed-line telephones. The demand estimation method takes advantage 
of the fact that subscribers faced different prices depending on whether they were lo-
cated in Magyar Telekom’s or Invitel’s area of service, and this price difference was ex-
ogenous, since the consumers’ current demand could not have influenced the assign-
ment of concessions 20 years prior. Using this fact, the paper first calculates the differ-
ence in demand in settlements in Magyar Telekom and Invitel areas that are otherwise 
similar, second, estimates the price difference between the two, and finally calculates 
the arc elasticity of demand using the first two results. Using cross-sectional data from 
2011, the estimated elasticity is low for both residential and business customers (be-
tween –0.1 and –0.2), far from the critical elasticity. Their panel estimations yield sim-
ilar results, even though this estimation is better for controlling for unobserved heter-
ogeneity between the regional markets. Based solely on the results of the demand es-
timation, one can draw the conclusion that fixed-line telephone services are a distinct 
relevant market, and the hypothesis of fixed-mobile substitution can be rejected.29
29 The authors also estimated the elasticity of demand based on a consumer survey. They expected 
the calculated elasticity to be a little higher (–0.5 was their best estimate), but even that result is 
enough to reject the hypothesis of fixed-mobile substitutability. 
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Kézdi and Csorba [2012] also estimate the relationship between price and quan-
tity data, investigating consumer lock-in in the Hungarian market for personal loans. 
The applied method is also similar to the difference-in-differences (DID) method 
introduced in the previous chapter: the authors compare the demand reactions of 
new consumers with those of old consumers, based on the assumption that the lat-
ter, who are locked in, can be considered a treated group, while the former can be 
their control group.30 The various estimation results show that the old consumers’ 
reaction to price changes is 70-80 per cent lower than that of the new consumers, 
which means that even the hypothesis of total lock-in (prohibitively high switching 
costs) cannot be rejected.
Demand estimation based on discrete choice models
One of the limitations of classic demand estimation techniques is that they hardly 
make any assumptions on the structure behind the factors influencing demand. 
Therefore, a large number of parameters must be estimated, which severely limits 
the applicability of the method. For example, if one wishes to estimate a complete 
demand system for 10 products, then, even without the control variablies, there 
would be 102 = 100 parameters to estimate, causing serious identification problems.
One solution to this problem is to use a discrete choice model, where the con-
sumers’ main choice is not how much of a given product to purchase, but which 
supplier to choose.31 Such models use a microeconomic model of consumer choice 
to derive linear demand equations. During estimation, their assumptions concern-
ing substitution patterns translate into parameter restrictions, which significantly 
decrease the number of parameters that need to be estimated. The most common 
method is to assign products to groups (high and medium quality domestic and 
import products, for example), and estimate a “common” cross-price elasticity for 
substitution between and within the groups. It is worth noting that demand esti-
mation based on discrete choice models is not the only possibility for estimating 
demand choices based on discrete choices, as demonstrated by the Hungarian pa-
pers discussed in the previous chapter. I will not discuss the further details of the 
approach based on discrete choice models, and refer the interested reader to a good 
survey provided in Muraközy [2010].
In general, the use of structural models, that is, the equations describing both 
demand and supply side behaviour are derived from theoretical models and then 
estimated, is most common in the case of estimation based on discrete choice mod-
30 In this case, for example, it was not possible to use adequate instruments, therefore the authors 
also used lagged price changes to estimate the demand reactions. 
31 The primary, but not only form of a discrete choice is when demand is either zero or one; examples 
include automobiles, or most telecommunications services and public utilities. 
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els,. I have found only one application of this type of method, in Molnár et al. [2007], 
who analyse competition in a market with differentiated products, the market for 
residential financial products.32 The paper estimates the own and cross-price elas-
ticity for various specifications, and uses these to calculate optimal margins using 
the general model of competition for the supply side. The margins observed in the 
market are then compared to the equilibrium outcomes of two specific models 
of competition (Bertrand-competition and collusion). The paper thus effectively 
measures market power on the specific markets, and finds that the level of compe-
tition is quite low in the markets for most financial products; even the hypothesis 
of collusion cannot be rejected.
There are a few more examples for demand estimation beased on discrete choic-
es: Crawford and Molnár [2008] analyse the effects of advertisements on the de-
mand (and its elasticity) for Hungarian mobile telephone services, while Tánczos 
and Török [2007] present an application in the area of transportation economics by 
modelling the flow of traffic between Budapest and Győr.33 Koltay [2012a] studies 
the German market, estimating the effect on consumer choices of the introduc-
tion of an eco-friendly brand in the market for hygiene products. He investigates 
how the results conform to various theoretical models describing the demand for 
common goods.
Analysing the supply side
Although they do not, in a strict sense, concern the relationship between prices (or 
some other performance indicator) and market structure or market behaviour, it is 
still worth discussing studies estimating production and cost functions, as well as 
production efficiences. The empirical methods employed typically seek to explain 
some output variable (production, cost, or productivity indicator) using the level 
of various inputs (or their price). The estimated equation is typically derived from 
the first order conditions of the firm’s (or industry’s) profit maximisation problem. 
There are only a handful of such papers in Hungary: Reiff et al. [2002] estimate 
production functions and various productivity indicators at an industry level, while 
Bisztray et al. [2010] estimate firms’ energy efficiency in the case of water utilities.
32 Paizs [2009] also estimates a structural model, however, he estimates the reaction functions of 
a specific theoretical model of competition, and not the equations for optimal behavioural in 
a discrete choice model. Furthermore, the paper estimates a model for the competition between 
European countries in determining excise taxes, which is a cross-market interaction. 
33 Édes et al. [2011] provide a general survey of the empirical methods for analysing substitutability 
between modes of transport.
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CONCLUSION
This paper set out to survey Hungarian empirical IO analyses from the past decade, 
and also draw attention to the diversity of empirical methods that can be applied. 
The groups into which the methods have been sorted do not represent a ranking of 
quality: while it is true in general that more detailed databases enable the use of more 
complex empirical methods, this does not mean that the results will be more reliable 
(and especially not that they will be more easy to interpret in practice). Therefore 
it is important to be familiar with the various empirical methods, their advantages 
and their limitations, and to interpret the available facts according to several meth-
ods, if possible. This can be considered a type of robustness check.34 I have shown 
several cases where relatively standard (reduced form) econometric methods were 
sufficient to conduct empirical analyses which could effectively assist in rejecting 
or verifying various hypotheses important in competition policy and regulation.
Surveying the Hungarian studies in empirical IO we can also draw the interest-
ing conclusion that the majority of the authors is not or not only an academic. This 
confirms the common supposition that these studies are typically connected to 
practical application, and also that it is in institutions that are not foremost research 
facilities that authors encounter topics and databases which can be used to produce 
scientifically sound results. Four such institutions can be identified: the Regional 
Centre for Energy Policy Research (REKK), Infrapont Economic Consulting, the 
Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) and the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB). 
We can only hope that these institutions can continue their scientific work, and that 
access to databases will improve so that in the future, research facilities can also 
focus more on modern empirical industrial organisation.
34 As one of the reviewers of this paper aptly commented: “An empirical model is like the Hungarian 
language. It can be used to tell the truth, but also to lie.”
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